By highlighting the necessary hypotheses and presenting disposal methods as deductible arguments, we have abandoned any excuse for methods like this to solve or eliminate the “problem of induction.” To the extent that the necessary observations are possible, the definitive justification for any application of any of these amplative induction methods depends on the justification of the hypothesis used; Since this rate is general, it will probably have to be supported by another type of inductive, or at least non-deductible, argument. But we must leave aside this question of definitive justification. However, where we have a very large number of extremely different cases of effect and there seems to be only one factor in all of them, we can use a 8.12 method actually closer. The various proceedings cover at least a wide range of all possible combinations of potentially relevant factors and their negations. Therefore, it is likely that no condition that is not covered by the formula (A or…) is necessary, and therefore, if there is a necessary and sufficient condition, (A or … ) is so, and therefore A itself is a sufficient condition of the phenomenon. These methods have been criticized on two main points: first, it is claimed that they do not define the conclusions envisaged, so that they are not methods of evidence or conclusive demonstrations; and second, that they are not useful as investigative methods. This criticism has been used to support the general finding that these methods play little or no role in the exploration of nature and that the scientific method requires a radically different description. With respect to the difference method, the observation of 1.2 (or, if the negations are admitted, those of 2.2) continues to yield results, although the conclusions become less complete, i.e.
the cause is less and less specified. For example, in 8.2, if we assume that there is a necessary and sufficient condition for the F-in-F, which may be one of the possible causes, or a negation of one, or a combination of possible causes or negations, or a disjunction of possible causes or negations, or a combination of potential causes or negations, which in fact allows the actual state to be constructed in one way or another from possible causes — the observation of 2.2. the conclusion that the required condition is (A… or…). That is, it is either A itself, or a conjunction containing A, or a disjunction in which one of the disjunctions A is itself or a conjunction containing A. Since such a break is a sufficient condition in a necessary and sufficient state, this finding, in which the presence of A in I1 is the only potentially relevant difference between I1 and N1, even in the least severe hypothesis that A is at least a necessary part of a sufficient condition for P in F – the sufficient condition is (A…).